In this paper we evaluate the heterogeneous effects of online copyright enforcement. We ask whether the unexpected shutdown of the popular file hosting platform Megaupload had a differential effect on box office revenues of wide-release vs. niche movies. Identification comes from a comparison of movies that were available on Megaupload to those that were not. We show that only movies that premiere in a relatively large number of theaters benefitted from the shutdown of Megaupload. The average effect, however, is negative. We provide suggestive evidence that this result is driven by information externalities. The idea is that online piracy acts as a mechanism to spread information about product characteristics across consumers with different valuations for the product. Our results question the effectiveness of blanket public anti-piracy policy, not only from a consumer perspective, but also from a producer perspective.
Introduction
Online piracy is generally considered a threat to profits of producers of information goods, such as software, music, books, and movies, which, in the long run, may reduce incentives to invest in the production of such products. Consequently, governments have repeatedly taken action to enforce copyright online.
Empirical research has reached some consensus that such efforts can increase producer surplus. Such results are typically based on data on relatively successful products (Danaher and Waldfogel, 2012; , or work that estimates average effects (Gopinath et al., 2013; Adermon and Liang, 2014; . That is, although theory has developed a good understanding of product differentiation and network effects in the piracy context (see reviews in Waelbroeck, 2006 and Belleflamme and Peitz, 2012) , empirical evidence studying heterogeneous effects is still scarce. A small number of studies does address product heterogeneity to some degree (Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, 2007, Bhattacharjee et al., 2007, Zhang, forthcoming) . However, these studies typically do not observe variation in the strength of online piracy at the product level, which limits the extent of the conclusions that can be drawn.
In this paper, we study product heterogeneity in the context of the shutdown of Megaupload and its effect on movie box office revenues. We use weekly revenues of a set of movies in 14 countries in 2011 and 2012 from Boxofficemojo, a commercial provider of industry statistics, and obtained data on a movie's availability on Megaupload by accessing archived versions of the linking website movie2k.to. Our identification strategy builds on a standard difference-in-difference approach where the first difference comes from the shutdown and the second difference from the availability of specific movies on Megaupload. That latter piece of the identification strategy is what lets our data speak to the question of product heterogeneity.
Quite surprising in light of previous empirical work, we find that box office revenues of a majority of movies that have been available on Megaupload do not increase in response to the shutdown. Indeed, the average effect is negative. Looking closer we find that only movies that were on release in a relatively large number of theaters (wide release) benefited from the shutdown of Megaupload, while the effect on more narrowly released movies was neutral and even negative for niche movies. We subject these results to a number of robustness checks to rule out alternative explanations using different specifications and additional data.
One mechanism that can explain these prima facie counterintuitive findings is that piracy generates positive externalities through information about the quality (and existence) of an experience good spilling over from pirates to potential customers. Once it becomes significantly less easy to consume pirated content online, as was the case in our empirical setting, we would expect that at least some consumers revert to licensed consumption.
At the same time, the positive externalities from pirates to non-pirates vanish, so that a number of prospective customers end up being less informed about specific titles, which reduces their likelihood of going to the theater. The net effect on a specific movie's revenues then depends on how important the information externality is for the performance of this movie. Large blockbusters (i.e., wide-release movies) may be able to compensate with large advertising budgets, while word-of-mouth is likely to matter more for movies targeted at smaller audiences.
The effect of the Megaupload shutdown has been studied previously in , but with different emphasis and methods. They investigate how the number of licensed digital sales and rentals changes, while we focus on box office revenues; they find a positive effect, while the average effect in our sample is negative. Finding less or even zero displacement the theatrical setting could be explained by exogenous differences between the studied distribution channels, be it that theater-goers pirate less or home video is a closer substitute. The fact that we find the opposite average effect, however, may be related to different sampling strategies. work with aggregated data obtained from three major studios, while we analyze a disaggregated data set that includes movies produced by both major and independent studios. This is one reason why the movies in the respective samples are likely to be quite different, much more however, because movies typically become available on the home video market only after they ran in the theaters. Theatrical display is limited in time, making word-of-mouth an important factor for box office success, which in turn is highly correlated with home video sales (Prosser, 2002) . The information effect of piracy therefore hits most directly when the movie is still running in the theaters, but carries over to the home video market indirectly with a lag that is most likely too long to show in the sample of .
In that sense, for licensed digital sales, word-of-mouth is unlikely to play a big direct and immediate role, which is why they do not discuss it explicitly. Finally, identification in comes from differences in the penetration of Megaupload in different countries, essentially exploiting within-firm, across-country variation in the severity of the shock over time. In our study, variation is at the movie level as we have information about the (global) availability of individual movies on Megaupload. This identification strategy is better suited to our needs as we are especially interested in how the effect of online copyright enforcement varies across different types of movies. Even given all these differences, we show that our most conservative estimates are quite similar to in terms of economic significance.
Our study speaks to the recent global debate on copyright in the digital society and suggest that a blanket policy on piracy may affect firms differently, depending on their product portfolio, business model and market presence. An implication of our results could be that private enforcement -i.e. increased and targeted efforts of content providers to make unlicensed consumption of their content more difficult (Reimers, 2016) -may be better able to alleviate the negative effects of online piracy for some products, while allowing firms to benefit from the positive effects with respect to other products.
2 Movie piracy and the Megaupload shutdown
Megaupload and online movie piracy
The increased availability of fast broadband connections in the last decade made online transfer of large files feasible, leading to an upsurge in video downloading and streaming over the Internet. This did not only open up a new potential distribution channel for the movie industry, but it also enabled users to access pirated movie content more easily and at a larger scale.
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) protocols such as BitTorrent originally played a leading role in the distribution of copyright infringing content. The decentralized hosting of files on private computers makes it difficult to shut down those protocols and no single operator has to incur costs for infrastructure and bandwidth. However, usage of P2P protocols requires installation of applications, configuration of network settings, and usually does not enable immediate streaming, limiting P2P movie piracy to a small group of expert, heavy users and rendering it inconvenient for less experienced computer users. The emergence of filehosters (or cyberlockers) made consumption of infringing movie content considerably easier: no installation of applications and network configuration is necessary and many filehosters even support direct video streaming, making use of these services as convenient as watching a video clip on YouTube.
Founded in 2005, Megaupload grew to a dominant position in the filehoster market, by then the dominant channel to distribute pirated movie content. Megaupload made it easy for users to upload large files, which could then be made publicly available by distributing a link to the uploaded file. Movie files could then be either downloaded or directly streamed through Megaupload 's sister website Megavideo, launched in August 2007. Both services were financed through advertising revenues and premium subscriptions. In the free version of Megaupload, download speed was limited and video streaming was interrupted after 72 minutes for 30 minutes, which made it impossible for free consumers to watch a full-length movie in one go. Megaupload quickly became very popular and claimed to have more than 50 million daily visitors, more than 180 million registered users, and was capturing 4% of total Internet traffic at its peak. 1
While direct visits to the Megaupload website usually did not bring up pirated content, movies could easily be located through search engines and to an even larger extent through link portals. Link portals act as link libraries and enable easy searching and browsing through links directed to filehosters.
The symbiotic relationship between Megaupload and the link portals created a grey area where legal responsibility was hard to attribute. The link portals claimed to be legal as they didn't host any content, while Megaupload claimed to be legal as they promised to take down unlicensed content when asked to do so. Still, Megaupload was widely 1 See also Manhanti et al. (2012) who show that Megaupload and sister sites accounted for 68% of traffic to the top-10 cyberlocker sites in a 30,000 user campus network in 2009. This is equivalent to some 15 terabytes of data or 3% of overall HTTP traffic volume. Revenues in billion US$ Box office: International, US and Canada, Electronic Homevideo: US Source: MPAA Theatrical Market Statistics, 2010 , PwC Global Entertainment and Media Outlook (2013 -2017 considered to be at the very least a willing accomplice to extensive illegal filesharing. Chris Dodd, the chairman of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) said: "By all estimates, Megaupload.com is the largest and most active criminally operated website targeting creative content in the world. [...] The site generated more than $175 million in criminal proceeds and cost U.S. copyright owners more than half a billion dollars." 2 Interestingly, the development of box office and home video revenues in the US and Canada as well as in international markets in figure 1 shows no obvious downturn: revenues increase in international markets from 2006, while at the same time box office revenues in the American markets remain stable. Revenues from electronic home video purchases (IP-TV, over-the-top content, and streaming services such as Netflix ) also increased in the US market since 2008.
Of course, this descriptive analysis does not tell the full story because we lack a counterfactual that lets us compare revenues with piracy to revenues without piracy. In what follows, we propose a way to establish causality under some modest assumptions.
The shutdown of Megaupload as a natural experiment
The shutdown of Megaupload is an exogenous shock well-suited to identify the effect of movie piracy on box office revenues. The Megaupload website was closed down on January 19th 2012 after an indictment by a federal grand jury. On the same day, raids were conducted in 8 countries, with search warrants being issued for 20 properties. Kim Dotcom, the founder of Megaupload and some of his managers were arrested in a spectacular dawn raid on his home in New Zealand and company assets were seized. 3
On top of the largest filehoster being taken down, the events of January 19th, 2012 had additional consequences for the filehosting market as a whole. The shutdown was accompanied by massive press coverage, creating large public interest, visible in the spike in For the shutdown to let us reliably identify the causal effects of movie piracy, we have to be Relative Weekly Worldwide Search Volume Megaupload, Megavideo Source: Google Trends confident that the event was indeed exogenous to the parties involved. As no reports about an expected shutdown leaked beforehand, it is plausible that the shutdown was exogenous to moviegoer demand. Megaupload itself did not implement any changes beforehand in possible anticipation of a legal intervention. Moreover, the management team did not try to relocate to a third country before their arrest, which they might have done had they expected the upcoming shutdown and the associated arrests. Finally, although industry organizations were seemingly involved in the investigations, it is hard to believe that they could have affected the exact timing of the shutdown. In particular, the more people are aware of the impending shutdown, the higher the risk of leakage, which would dramatically reduce the chances of success. On top of that, the long production cycles of movies makes strategic short-term supply-side reactions (e.g. delaying the release of a movie because of the imminent shutdown) unlikely.
Methods and data

Identification strategy
The fact that the shutdown of Megaupload was exogenous to all market participants is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for being able to identify the causal effect of movie piracy on box office performance. We further want to compare the actual outcome after the shutdown to some plausible counterfactual that would have occurred in the absence of the shutdown. Of course, it is impossible to observe box office performance of the same movie in both states of the world. However, it is possible to define a control group of movies that were not affected by the intervention. Under the assumption that the group of affected movies would have followed a similar sales trend in the absence of the intervention, we can compare the performance of affected and unaffected movies before and after the shutdown of Megaupload. We provide some support in favor of this assumption by looking at differences in pre-intervention trends of affected and unaffected movies in section 4.1.
The empirical implication of this identification strategy requires us to find a way to observe whether a movie was available for downloading or streaming on Megaupload before the shutdown. We can then compare the box office performance of movies that were available (treatment group) to movies that were not (control group), before and after the shutdown by estimating δ in a standard difference-in-differences model defined as
In this model, R ijt denotes box office revenues of movie i in country j at time t, M ega i indicates availability on Megaupload before the shutdown, and Af ter t indicates the time period after the shutdown. Country suffixes are not necessary for the shutdown dummy (Af ter t ) and Megaupload availability (M ega i ) as the website was accessible (and subsequently non-accessible) in all countries.
We make use of the panel structure of our data and include a number of fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity. First, movies obviously differ in their inherent appeal to audiences. Some characteristics that determine a movie's appeal may be observable, e.g. previous commercial success of actors and directors, while others remain unobservable. We control for such time-invariant heterogeneity by including movie fixedeffects µ i . As a result however, we cannot separately identify a coefficient for a specific movie's pre-shutdown availability on Megaupload, as this variable is also time-invariant.
Second, seasonality matters for the box office performance of movies, so we include week fixed-effects w t and year fixed-effects y t . Finally, we account for unobserved time-invariant differences between countries in ν j , which for example allows us to control for heterogeneity coming from differences in the size of population and therefore the number of movie theaters.
Because the intervention hits them at different stages of their life-cycle, different movies experience different revenue growth patterns before and after the shutdown by virtue of their age. We account for this by controlling for the time since the movie has premiered in a given country. This variable is included in the vector C ijt .
Assumptions about the error term ε ijt are standard, but we allow for heteroscedasticity within observations of the same movie by clustering. Serial correlation of error terms is an obvious concern in our setting, therefore we report results from a number of different specifications following Bertrand et al. (2004) in section 4.2.
Data
We construct a rich dataset from a variety of public sources, starting with weekly countrylevel box office revenue data from Boxofficemojo, a commercial provider of movie industry statistics. We match this with information obtained from IMDb, the leading Internet platform for movie meta information, which lets us observe international titles and whether the movie is a remake or part of sequel. It is not possible to directly observe a list of movies available on Megaupload, mainly because the website never had a user interface displaying the uploaded content to a public audience. The way consumers accessed files stored on Megaupload was via link portals that provided a catalogue of available movies.
Much like licensed services such as Netflix or Amazon Prime, a link portal provides metainformation and links to downloads or streams hosted by a cyberlocker, often organized by genres, popularity or release years. Information about the contents of linking sites therefore provides an indirect way to measure (at least a lower bound of) availability on a cyberlocker.
We collect information on whether a movie was available for streaming on We discuss potential measurement errors with this data in section 4.5.
Our final sample includes weekly observations of 308 movies in 14 countries (see table   1 ) from 2011 to 2012. Descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis are reported in table 2, along with a mean difference comparison between treated and untreated observations. Across almost all variables, we do not see a significant difference between affected and unaffected observations. We do observe relatively more treated movies after the intervention. 9
Our main variable of interest is weekend box office revenues, measured in US dollars.
The definition of "weekend" differs across weeks and countries. Boxofficemojo sometimes reports revenue figures based on two, three, four or five days. We therefore control for the number of days in a given weekend and country. Because the variable is heavily skewed (mean: $623,132; median: $42,080), we use the log in the regressions. We measure a movie's country-specific age by counting the number of weeks since the launch in a given country. The average lifetime is some 7 weeks, but there are also some movies that run for more than 30 weeks (most of which are narrowly released ("small") movies in the genres animation, documentary, and short film; the maximum is 213 weeks). We therefore use the log of weeks active in our estimations. The shutdown of Megaupload occurred on Thursday, January 19th, 2012, i.e. in the third calendar week. Revenue data for the third calendar week in 2012 refer to January 20th to 22nd. We therefore define the post shutdown period as after 2012w2 and construct a corresponding dummy variable.
4 Effects of the shutdown on box office revenues
Testing the identifying assumption
Before we present the results of our various specifications, we investigate if treated and untreated movies follow similar pre-intervention trends. This is the testable part of our identifying assumption, i.e. that revenues of both types of movies would have developed Note: Standard errors (clustered at the movie-level) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 in the same way had the shutdown not taken place.
Figure 3 plots week-treatment group coefficients θ k estimated in a model defined as
as a test for the identifying assumption of similar pre-intervention trends of treatment and control group. We look at weekly differences in revenues across the two groups of observations. For the whole pre-intervention period, both groups follow trends that are indistinguishable from zero at the 90% significance level. Further, the results show a clear change after the shutdown of Megaupload on January 19th, 2012. Hence, after the intervention, treatment and control group start to have diverging trends. This gives a strong indication that our identification strategy is sound for estimating the causal effect we are after.
Baseline results
Results of the main regressions are presented in table 3. Across all columns we report results of models that include year, calendar week (or month, respectively), country, and movie fixed effects. Because serial correlation could result in incorrect inference, we report different specifications as proposed by Bertrand et al. (2004) . Standard errors are clustered at the movie-level in the first column, at the country-level in the second column, and at the movie-and country-level in the third column. We report estimates using block bootstrapping with 5,000 replications (with country-movie blocks) in the fourth column.
Throughout all model specifications, the coefficient of Weekend Days is negative, mainly because Boxofficemojo tends to report longer weekends in smaller countries. 10 The lifecycle follows the expected decreasing non-linear trend. In the fifth column we estimate a model that neglects most of the time dimension by using averages at the month-level (Bertrand et al., 2004) .
Across all specifications, the estimated coefficient for the difference-in-differences is negative. Although not estimated very precisely (significant at the 10% level), the effect is of sizable magnitude, suggesting that weekend revenues of the average movie decreased by about two thirds. 11 10 For example, five day weekends are only observed in France and Belgium. Most weekends reported for the US are three days long. 11 (Exp(-1.131)-1)*100=-.677. We measure a movie's targeted audience size using information about the exhibition intensity of a movie in its first week in a given country. The number of opening screens is an important strategic variable and is closely related to the targeted audience and expected demand for a movie (Roos and Shachar, 2014) . We do not directly use absolute numbers or market shares per country and week because such measures are endogenous when theater owners can for example quickly adjust the number of screens as a response to (unexpected) changes in demand. Using the exhibition intensity -the "width" of a release -in the first week as a measure of expected overall demand (De Vany and Walls, 1996) can mitigate this issue.
For most countries Boxofficemojo reports the total number of screens per movie and weekend, while for some countries we observe the number of theaters. 13 This is not the same since one theater location may play a movie on several screens.
To ensure that we are not picking up this artifact in the estimations, we relate the first-week 13 These countries are Australia, France, Germany, and Italy. Excluding these countries gives the same qualitative results, albeit at reduced significance. (Sawhney and Eliashberg, 1996: 119) . The results reported in the first column could therefore be a reflection of two contrary effects that cancel out in the averages.
To investigate this, we define "wide release" movies as within the 90th percentile, "narrow release" movies as those below the 10th percentile, and the remaining movies are those between the 10th and 90th percentile. We use these "medium release" movies as Our results are reported in column (2) of table 4. The difference-in-differences coefficient After*Mega remains negative, but the estimate is not significantly different from zero. We find a positive and significant coefficient for After*Mega*Wide Release and a negative and 14 We choose this time period as it marks the start of Megavideo. However, as 94% of all movies in our data are not released before the first week of 2011, choosing a shorter time period does not affect the results.
significant coefficient for After*Mega*Narrow Release. Hence, after the shutdown, revenues
of movies that open on a relatively small number of screen decrease, while revenues of movies that are on wide release increase.
The coefficients are perhaps too imprecisely estimated to draw overly broad quantitative conclusions. The effect sizes are strikingly large but also come with large confidence bands. Revenues of narrow release movies decrease by about 85% (≈ e 1.315 − 1) after the intervention compared to medium-sized movies. The 90% confidence band spreads from -98% to -4%. Revenues of widely released movies increased by some 273% (≈ e −1.895 − 1), with a 90% confidence band from 47% to 843%. Expressed in dollar units this translates a 85% decline into $640,800 and a 273% increase into $4,108,000 respectively. 15 Taking into consideration that our coefficient estimates are not extremely precise, we prefer to use our most conservative estimates of -4% and 47%, which lets us arrive at a decline worth $30,000 and an increase worth $707,000. Figure 3 suggests that the effect becomes significant only after a couple of weeks. To understand this, it is useful to remind ourselves that identification comes from a comparison of the same movie before and after the shutdown. That is, the effect for weeks relatively long after the shutdown is identified by movies that run relatively long in the theaters.
Heterogeneity over time
It turns out that the average length of the theater lifecycle is largely determined by the release strategy (Sawhney and Eliashberg, 1996; Chen et al., 2013) . Wide release means that the movie runs simultaneously in a large number of theaters across the country, while a narrow release strategy implies that the movie opens in a limited number of theaters sequentially in selected cities. As a consequence, revenues of wide release movies typically follow a L-shaped form, with a peak within the first few weeks and a fast decay thereafter.
In contrast, sales of narrow release movies are much less concentrated in the first weeks and more evenly distributed over time, decaying at a much lower rate. This naturally implies that the lifecycle of wide release movies is typically shorter than the lifecycle of 15 Subtracting country-specific means, the average pre-shutdown weekend revenue is $753,892 for narrow release movies, i.e. 753,892*0.85 ≈640,800. For wide release movies it is $1,504,787, i.e. 1,504,787*2.73≈4,108,000. Effect on wide release movies over time Effect on narrow release movies over time Note: Same specification as in narrow release movies, which is also evident in our sample. The average number of weeks we observe a movie that we define as a wide release is 7.37, which is significantly smaller than the average number of weeks we observe a movie we define as narrow release (12.85).
Hence, the identification of the shutdown effect in the first weeks after the shutdown comes from all types of movies, while it increasingly comes from more narrow release movies in later weeks.
To see more closely how this operates, we augment the model in table 4 with a linear time trend that we interact with Af ter * M ega, Af ter * M ega * W ideRelease and Af ter * M ega * N arrowRelease. In figure 4 we plot the corresponding effect estimates as function of time, e.g. Af ter * M ega + Af ter * M ega * T rend. In the first couple of weeks we observe a significant negative effect on medium release movies, significant positive effect on wide release movies and an non-significant negative effect on narrow release movies. In later weeks, the effect on both medium and wide release movies becomes insignificant (with a very large standard error in the latter case), while the negative effect on narrow release movies becomes significant. Hence, when the positive and negative effect cancel out in the first couple of weeks, and narrow release movies dominate the sample in the longer run, this is consistent with the insignificant short-run, but significantly negative long-run effect that figure 3 suggests.
Effects on revenue distribution
Having established that the policy intervention affects different types of movies in different ways, we now focus on the effects on the distribution of revenues across firms and movies. The Megaupload shutdown can potentially affect market structure significantly if especially movies that are released widely benefit while revenues of more narrowly released productions are hurt.
First, we begin by looking at effect differences between major and independent distributors. 16 Our results in the first column of table 5 suggest that the shutdown of Megaupload did not disproportionately benefit larger movie distributors. The interpretation is that the effect is happening at the movie-, not the distributor-level. Put differently, larger companies sometimes release movies narrowly, while smaller companies sometimes put their movies on wide release. In columns two and three of table 5 we look more specifically at the distribution of revenues in a given week. First we investigate whether the top of the distribution has changed as a result of the intervention by looking at the difference between revenues of the most and second most grossing movie in a given week and country.
The coefficient of After*Mega is not significant, suggesting that the intervention did not accelerate a superstar effect. However, looking at the difference between the biggest and smallest movie in a given week and country (measured in box office revenues) carries an important insight. The estimated coefficient of After*Mega is positive and significant, which implies that the shutdown of Megaupload increased the gap between the top and least grossing movie. As illustrated in figure 5 , this indicates that the shutdown of Megaupload made the market more concentrated, shifting mass towards the head of the distribution. The main result of our analyses is that the shutdown of a large supplier of unlicensed downloads did not have a positive effect across the board. We find that smaller and larger movies, as measured by the width of their initial release, were differentially affected by the shutdown of Megaupload. While widely released blockbuster movies benefitted from the shutdown on average, the effect on revenues of most other movies is either statistically not distinguishable from zero or even negative. This result is surprising for two reasons.
First, intuitively one would not expect that removing the option of free consumption can have a negative effect on firm revenues. And second, it is not immediately clear why the effect is negative for smaller movies but turns positive for larger ones.
One way of thinking about our first main finding that some movies may see a drop in revenues if piracy is reduced is that piracy may play an important role in how consumers become aware of products and collect information about product quality. Figure 6 showing survey data from a representative sample of 25,000 Germans suggests that the primary source of information is advertising, while at the same time purchase decisions are often influenced by recommendations of friends. Similar data from the US suggests that some 30% of persons aged 12-74 that attended at least one movie in a theater during 2011 have used social media to discuss movies. 17 This notion is confirmed by several studies that show that recommendations by direct contacts play an important role in the demand for a particular product (Oestreicher-Singer and Sundararajan, 2012), its evaluation (Lee et al., forthcoming), or even aggregate demand for a media category (Hosanagar et al., 2014) . Thus, conventional advertising and online channels can interact in intricate ways (Joo et al., 2014) .
To see this more explicitly, consider the following simple thought experiment. If recommendations can come from pirates and consumers who have watched the movie through a licensed channel before, eliminating piracy reduces the likelihood that a consumer will receive a recommendation for a movie, which results in a lower likelihood to watch a particular movie in the theater. Given that word-of-mouth communication is an important promotion channel, the net effect of this could be negative at least for some movies. For which type of movies would we expect the word-of-mouth effect to be especially strong and the revenue effect to turn negative? Note that advertising budgets for movies are correlated with production budget (Vogel, 2004) , making up for up to 40% of the production budget (Prag and Casavant, 1994) . Production budget is positively correlated with wide release movies, and negatively correlated with narrow release movies. If narrow release movies have smaller marketing budgets, word-of-mouth is a relatively more important factor for their overall success. If this word-of-mouth effect is reduced with the shutdown of unlicensed content, the performance of narrow release movies is affected negatively.
We can make use of variation in the timing of advertising expenditures in search for more direct evidence for this type of information externality. The literature suggests that advertisement for motion pictures is typically concentrated around the opening week (Eliashberg et al., 2000) . The information effect of piracy should therefore not only vary by movie type, but also along a movie's lifecycle. We test this idea by augmenting the model in table 4. To see how the shutdown effect changes over the lifecycle of different types of movies, we add interactions with a linear and time-invariant measure of the movie's lifecyle before the shutdown. In figure 7 we plot the corresponding effect estimates as function of this variable, e.g. Af ter * M ega + Af ter * M ega * W eeksActiveBef oreShutdown. 18 The upper left panel suggests that medium release movies at different stages of their lifecycle are not affected in a significantly different way. The story is different for wide release and narrow release movies (lower panels of figure 7 ). Box office revenues increase for wide release movies that had just premiered when the shutdown happens. This effect becomes insignificant for wide release movies that had already been running for a longer time when
Megaupload disappears, and turns negative. Narrow release movies that haven't been exhibited in theaters for too long when the shutdown happens, experience a decrease in revenues. Again, this effect becomes insignificant for movies that are "older" when the shutdown happens. In summary, these results imply indirect evidence for the idea that advertising and piracy can have complementary effects. The types of movies that are likely to be advertised more than other types of movies, at the stage of their lifecycle where they are more likely to be advertised than at other stages of their lifecycle, are the only ones for which we can find evidence for a positive effect of the shutdown of Megaupload on box office revenues.
Information and heterogeneity across movies
A second piece of indirect evidence for the word-of-mouth logic emerges from the idea to exploit variation in the amount of information consumers have about movies, on top of advertising. We do this by distinguishing between different types of movies. Broadly, we can think of three types of movies: Original productions (e.g. Inception or The American), remakes of older versions (e.g. The Three Musketeers or Gulliver's Travels), and movies that are part of sequels (e.g. Cars 2 or The Hangover Part II ). The idea is that these types of movies can be ranked according to the amount of information the average consumer has about the characteristics of a movie (and therefore the likely match to her preferences).
The most extensive information is available on the plot of remakes, because a consumer may have watched the older version of the movie or the plot is commonly known. Sequels Wide release movie effect and weeks active before Narrow release movie effect and weeks active before share common characters and often continue the plot of a preceding movie, while the least is known about original movies.
We make use of this difference in available information across movie types by estimating three-way-interactions with our difference-in-differences indicator, leaving sequels as the omitted category. The results in table 6 confirm our basic intuition. While the baseline effect After*Mega remains negative and significant, the coefficient of After*Mega*Original is not different from zero and the estimate of After*Mega*Remake is significantly positive.
Hence, the interpretation is that with less word-of-mouth, consumers will tend to stick to products about which they already have relatively more information. A potential issue could be that our source of Megaupload availability, movie2k.to, is not representative of the contents of Megaupload. As a result, our definition of the control group would be "contaminated" by false negatives, leading to estimation bias. The direction and severity of the bias would depend on the sign and significance of a correlation between movie type and wrong or missing Megaupload information.
We can think of three major reasons why our measure may not be entirely optimal. First, we don't observe information about a particular movie, because it is not possible to access the entire historical content of movie2k.to through the Internet Archive. Second, the movie was not listed on movie2k.to at all. Third, movie2k.to listed the movie, but didn't link to
Megaupload although the movie was actually available.
To check the robustness of our results in this regard, we obtain similar historical information from a different source. Data used in Lauinger et al. (2013) , which the authors shared with us, lets us observe all links to movies that were posted on the website scnsrc.me from March 2009 to April 2012. In total, we observe 5,772 links corresponding to 3,828 movies, and whether these links point to Megaupload. We match this information to the box office revenue data using IMDb identifiers. It is noteworthy that the distribution of Megaupload links in the resulting sample (88%) is quite different to the movie2k.to sample (35%).
Hence, it looks like the number of observations in the movie2k.to control group is indeed somehow inflated. Still, the parallel-trend assumption of the difference-in-differences model also holds with this data. Results in columns 3 and 4 of 
Conclusion
We find that box office revenues reacted to the sudden shutdown of one of the main supply channels of unlicensed content, the cyberlocker Megaupload, in intricate ways. Specifically, the average movie reported less box office revenues after the shutdown. In further analysis, we find that the effect of the shutdown depends crucially on the breadth of a movie's release, i.e. the number of screens a movie on a movie's opening weekend. Movies on wide release, i.e. in the top decile of the number of opening screens, experience an increase in box office revenues, while movies in the bottom decile see a decline in box office revenues.
We rule out a number of alternative explanations, which lets us pinpoint this effect on the nature of the movie (not type of movie publisher) and its availability on Megaupload and the associated drop in pirated supply following the shutdown.
A plausible mechanism for this differential effect is the relative importance of word-ofmouth as a marketing channel. As the breadth of a release is likely to be correlated to other movie characteristics such as the targeted audience (e.g. mainstream versus niche) and production and advertising budgets, publishers may accompany the wide release of a movie with a large budget for "conventional" advertising.
We provide two pieces of suggestive evidence. First, we show that the negative effect of less piracy is weaker for movies that are hit by the shutdown relatively early in their theatrical lifecycle -a period where firms invest most heavily in advertising. Second, we find that the effect of the Megaupload shutdown is less negative for remakes, compared to originals and sequels, i.e. for movies about which consumers are more likely to have more information. We cannot test the word-of-mouth mechanism more directly, as this would require micro-level data that lets us determine individual pre-and post-shutdown behavior. However, future research could model a word-of-mouth-effect in a structural empirical model in the spirit of Givon et al. (1995 ) and De Vany and Walls (1996 .
It should be noted that we are studying the substitution patterns between one specific piracy channel and one licensed channel. This is in line with most of the recent literature which also capture only part of a movie's entire monetization chain (see, e.g. Zentner et al., 2013) . Theatrical box office accounted for 36% of overall industry revenues in 2012, our study period, second to physical home video with 42%, while electronic home video contributed 21% to overall movie revenues (PwC Global Entertainment and Media Outlook, 2013-2017) . Moreover, especially given that the movies we studied were still running in movie theaters, studying the substitution patterns between two concurrent channels (of which only one was licensed) generates important insights for the overall success of a movie, given that a movie's box office revenues are highly correlated to later monetization opportunities. Over time and for other distribution channels, we would expect the effect of word-of-mouth to subside.
It is interesting to compare our results to the findings by Danaher and Smith, 2014, who study the same question using data on (licensed) digital sales and rentals from three major motion picture studios. Their results show that revenues increased as a consequence of the Megaupload shutdown, while our paper finds a decrease in theatrical revenues for narrowrelease movies. For a large majority of movies we do not find that theatrical revenues change in a statistically significant way. Even given these differences, the economic effect size found in is quite similar to what we find -at least when compared to our most conservative estimate. estimate the weekly increase in revenue to be 6.5 -8.5%, which in dollar units is $222,000 -$285,000 for digital sales and $174,150 -$213,300 for digital rentals. Our most conservative estimate is an average weekly decrease of 4% or $30,000 for narrow release movies, and an average increase of 47% or $707,000 for wide release movies. Taking into account that the effect is not statistically different from zero for 80% of the movies in our sample, this results in an average effect for the entire sample of 4.3%.
Altogether, our results carry a number of implications. Most importantly, we have shown that heterogeneous products are affected differently by the availability of pirated substitutes. This suggests that firms may choose to protect their intellectual property more or less vigorously, depending on the balance of positive and negative effects they anticipate from piracy. As we have shown, these effects do not only depend on the type of product, but also on the product's stage of the life cycle. Hence, complementary effects of advertising and piracy need to be taken into account.
Moreover, we find that firm-level characteristics seem less important in determining the effect of piracy than product-level ones. For managers, this implies that positioning efforts and the associated IP strategy should take place at the product level and that, say, "Halo"-effects of an established brand are unlikely to substitute for the media-specific dynamics that arise from word-of-mouth promotional channels.
We contribute an alternative perspective to the emerging empirical literature on the effects of piracy. When online piracy has very different (even opposing) effects on heterogeneous products, that also depend on the distribution channel through which the products are being offered, blanket interventions aimed at reducing the negative welfare effects are difficult to implement because externalities may affect product variety and ultimately market structures.
Similar to Luo (2014) , who finds that IP protection may affect different types of content producers differently in the market for ideas, we find that even post-release IP strategies can lead to different outcomes across heterogeneous products, and to different outcomes across distribution channels . Hence, more research is needed to better understand how policies need to be designed across different dimensions and desired goals, which may include media diversity, sufficient niche content, but also overall welfare. 
